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Hollowing Out State Capacity1990; Evans 1995; Evans and Rauch 1999; Kohli 2004; Mazzucato 2015).
Drawing on the work of Max Weber, sociologists have suggested several
pathways underpinning the development of capable bureaucracies. One
perspective posits that cultural factors—like a Protestant work ethic—are
important for determinants of state capacity development, by commanding
citizens’ obedience (Weber 1930; Anderson 1991; Gorski 1993). Others em-
phasize the role of economic modernization, contending that industrial soci-
eties—unlike agrarian ones—have more complex needs best addressed by a
central state (Smelser 1964; Gellner 1983; Geddes 1994). The resource needs
of warfare also drive many countries to discipline state officers, thereby de-
veloping a functioning bureaucracy (Tilly 1990; Mann 1995; Hechter 2000).
Scholarship in global and transnational sociology has also elaborated on
the ways in which international forces affect the capabilities of states. First,
mimetic and normative isomorphism results in the gradual spread of policy
scripts that circulate transnationally, as states adopt and adapt them to suit
their purposes (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer et al. 1997; Drori and
Meyer 2006; Chorev 2012; Pinheiro, Chwieroth, andHicks 2015). For exam-
ple, Hwang (2006) shows the worldwide rise of national development plans
in the postwar era, following dominant norms in the world polity on state
planning. In contrast to the soft and slow normative-isomorphic processes,
world systems and dependency theories emphasize structural inequali-
ties inherent to contemporary globalization (Wallerstein 1974; Cardoso and
Faletto 1979; Chase-Dunn 1998). Within this framework, powerful inter-
governmental organizations—like the European Union or the World Bank—
are central actors that undergird and perpetuate the dependency of “periph-
eral”nations (developing countries) on the capitalist “core” (e.g.,Hanley,King,
and Tóth 2002; Panitch and Gindin 2012). To do so, these organizations make
their financial or technical support to developing countries conditional on the
introduction of certain reforms that—explicitly or implicitly—favor the inter-
ests of the West and weaken bureaucratic quality (Hamm, King, and Stuckler
2012; Ban 2016).
In this article, we build a theoretical and empirical bridge between world
systems theory and the Weberian-inspired political sociology arguments on
state capacity. While these two strands of scholarship have hitherto devel-
oped in little dialogue, we argue that their insights can be fruitfully com-
bined to develop a distinctive global and transnational sociological perspec-
tive on the determinants of state capacity. Our analysis focuses on the
activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—one of the world’s
most powerful international organizations—which has been able to set theand Cambridge Political Economy Society Trust) is gratefully acknowledged. Direct cor-
respondence toBernhardReinsberg, Centre forBusiness Research, 12TrumpingtonStreet,
Cambridge CB2 1QA, United Kingdom. E-mail: br385@cam.ac.uk
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Allbroad parameters of economic reform in the developing world (Halliday
and Carruthers 2007, 2009; Kentikelenis and Seabrooke 2017). This power
stems from the organization’s systemic role in upholding globalfinancial sta-
bility, which endows it with extensive resources and an unrivaled position as
a global lender of last resort. Through the practice of “conditionality,” the
IMF can mandate far-reaching policy changes, including the overhaul of
state administrations (Babb and Carruthers 2008). The IMF contends that
such policies are necessary for securing macroeconomic stability (Khan and
Knight 1983), while critics point to devastating and counterproductive ef-
fects on developing countries (Babb 2005; Evans and Sewell 2013; Sassen
2014). For example, IMF programs have been linked to the retrenchment
of public services, the dismantlement of state bureaucracies, and civil unrest
(Walton and Ragin 1990; Hanley et al. 2002; King and Sznajder 2006).
A major shortcoming of this scholarship is that IMF lending programs—
themainmechanismbywhich this prototypicalWestern-dominatedmultilat-
eral organization shapes peripheral states—are generally treated as “black
boxes”: it is assumed that they all contain a similar set of promarket and
antistate reforms that devastate public sectors. We question the merits of this
simple narrative. Using new data on conditionality, we examine the extent
to which distinct components of IMF programs have a differential impact
on bureaucratic quality. In particular, we distinguish between two types of
IMF conditionality: structural conditions, or intrusive reforms that seek to
transform countries’ political economies via deregulation, liberalization, and
privatization; and stabilization conditions, which are less intrusive broad tar-
gets on macroeconomic indicators intended to reduce balance-of-payments
deficits (Polak 1991;Toye 1994;Vreeland 2007;Dreher 2009;Woo2013).We
posit that structural conditions diminish the ability of states to recruit, train,
and retain qualified personnel, and so we expect them to reduce bureaucratic
quality.
Empirically, we study the effects of IMF conditionality on state capacity
in developing countries from 1985 to 2014. Using data from the International
Country Risk Guide as a measure of bureaucratic quality, we find that
structural conditions reduce bureaucratic quality and that stabilization con-
ditions exert no significant effect. Further analysis reveals that, more specif-
ically, conditions that require privatization of state-owned enterprises, lift-
ing of price regulations, and reductions in the number or wages of civil
servants underlie the negative effect of structural conditions. In addition,
using data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Surveys, we find that firms experiencemore bribery by public officials when
countries under IMF programs face more structural conditions. Our results
are significant even after accounting for nonrandom selection into IMFpro-
grams and the potential endogeneity of conditionality. Confidence in our1224
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Hollowing Out State Capacityfindings is also bolstered by the fact that they are consistent across both
perception- and experience-based measures of bureaucratic quality.
By casting light on the erstwhile undertheorized relationship between state
capacity and world systems and dependency theories, our article integrates
previously disparate insights from national-level political-sociological argu-
ments (e.g., Skocpol 1979; Mann 1986; Evans and Rauch 1999) and global
and transnational sociology (e.g., Hanley et al. 2002; King and Sznajder
2006; Li and Hicks 2016). In doing so, we document how the dynamics of
political-bureaucratic development are inextricably linked not only to broad
global forces (like trade or war) but also to specific global actors: organiza-
tions—whether intergovernmental, nongovernmental, or private—that dif-
fuse cultural scripts of legitimate state structure. Such scripts can entrench
the rationalities of global capitalism (Kentikelenis and Seabrooke 2017), with
profound implications for the developmental trajectories of low- and middle-
income countries.
Our findings also contribute to other branches of social scientific inquiry
on state capacity, including political science (e.g., Hendrix 2010; Fortin-
Rittberger 2014; Cingolani, Thomsson, and de Crombrugghe 2015) and eco-
nomics (e.g., BräutigamandKnack 2004; Rodrik, Subramanian, andTrebbi
2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, andMastruzzi 2008; Broich, Szirmai, and Thoms-
son 2015). To our knowledge, we present the first systematic inquiry into the
effects of IMF conditionality on state capacity. Further, we contribute to so-
ciologically informed policy debates by demonstrating the malleability of
state capacity within a shorter time horizon than sociologists have come to
expect based on earlier research. Finally, we offer methodological contribu-
tions to studies on the consequences of reform programs mandated by inter-
national organizations. In using a compound instrumentation technique to
account for endogeneity of conditionality, our estimates lend themselves to
causal interpretation, while other interpretations—for example, that coun-
tries with weak state capacity might receive systematically different condi-
tions—can be ruled out.STATE CAPACITY, BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY,
AND THE WORLD SYSTEM
Bureaucratic Quality as a Key Ingredient of State Capacity
Sociologists have long recognized that capable states require professional
bureaucracies—characterized by legal rationality, hierarchical organization,
and incorruptible staff—committed to delivering high-quality public ser-
vices (Weber 1978; Skocpol 1979; Mann 1986). In their seminal article, Evans
and Rauch (1999) unpack “Weberianness” as a synonym for bureaucratic
quality, comprising meritocratic staffing, professional training, long-term1225
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Allcareer opportunities in the public sector, competitive salaries, and performance-
based rewards. Using surveys to collect information on these variables for
35 countries, they find thatWeberianness positively correlates with economic
growth. More recently, researchers from the Quality of Government Insti-
tute assembled an expert-survey data set on the structure of public bureau-
cracies for 159 countries, covering three dimensions of bureaucratic quality:
professionalization, openness, and impartiality (Dahlström et al. 2015). Us-
ing these data, Nistotskaya and Cingolani (2016) show that countries in which
bureaucracies are more insulated from day-to-day oversight by individual
politicians have more effective business regulation and higher rates of busi-
ness entry. Teorell (2015) finds that having an impartial, depoliticized, and
incorruptible bureaucracy reduces the risk of interstate conflict.
Yet, robust bureaucratic quality also requires links between state bureau-
crats and societal actors, notably business. For example, Block (1987) draws
on the experience of high-income countries to show that when business in-
terests acquire too much influence over the state administration, state pol-
icies will be least successful in solving societal problems. In a development
context, the economic trajectory of the East Asian “tiger” countries high-
lights the importance of well-targeted industrial policy interventions aimed
at addressing key impediments to catching up with high-income countries
(Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Evans 1998; Kohli 2004). These interventions
are most impactful under conditions of “embedded autonomy” of the state
bureaucracy; that is, a state-society arrangement in which bureaucrats en-
joy autonomy from, but also close ties to, business elites to devise and im-
plement successful policies (Evans 1995). In other words, embeddedness re-
quires that bureaucrats have a close eye on the needs of businesses to
identify the appropriate development policies. Indeed, “only a well-trained
bureaucracy will be able to manage the strategic collaboration . . . between
the private sector and the government with the aim of learning where the
most important bottlenecks are” (Rodrik 2014, p. 485). Effective delivery
of public services is endangered, however, if bureaucrats fall prey to partic-
ularistic interests (Rothstein and Teorell 2012).World Systems, Dependency, and State Capacity
in the Developing World
While scholars have long discussed domestic forces underpinning state ca-
pacity (e.g., Gellner 1983; Gorski 1993; Geddes 1994), in this article we focus
on its international determinants. To be sure, we are not the first to draw
attention to global factors. For example, Tilly (1990) shows that the threat
of war increased pressures for states to build centralized administrations.
However, we are interested in those determinants of administrative struc-1226
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Hollowing Out State Capacitytures that denote agency by some global actors. In this regard, the IMF
as an “agent of neoliberalism” (Babb and Kentikelenis 2018; also Hironaka
2014, pp. 77–103) represents an international force that exerts direct policy
pressure toward unleashing market forces in developing countries (Wade
2001, 2002).
One body of scholarship in global and transnational sociology has em-
phasized mimetic and normative isomorphic processes that result in the
gradual spread of policy scripts circulating transnationally, as states adopt
them to suit their purposes (Meyer et al. 1997; Schofer and Hironaka 2005;
Drori and Meyer 2006; Frank, Longhofer, and Schofer 2007; Chorev 2012;
Schofer et al. 2012; Boyle, Kim, and Longhofer 2015; Longhofer et al. 2016;
Broome, Homolar, and Kranke 2017). In relation to the IMF, mimetic iso-
morphism occurs when states emulate the behavior of more successful
countries that have adopted the organization’s policy advice (Henisz, Zelner,
and Guillén 2005; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Pinheiro et al. 2015),
and normative isomorphism describes how IMF staff interact with local of-
ficials via technical assistance to bring about new state norms (Chwieroth
2007; Broome and Seabrooke 2015).
In contrast to these soft and slow isomorphic processes, we deploy in-
sights from dependency and world systems theories to understand how
IMF lending programs affect state capacity.2 These theories emphasize that
countries interact in a hierarchical global economic architecture in which
core or advanced nations reproduce conditions of underdevelopment for pe-
ripheral or developing nations (Wallerstein 1974, 1979; Amin 1976). The
earliest studies in this tradition argued that the economic penetration of de-
veloping countries by advanced countries—in the form of exploitative trade
and investments in natural resources—stunted economic development in
the former through transfers in surplus to the latter (Baran 1957; Frank
1967). The consequences of dependency for state capacity remained gener-
ally undertheorized, but the implication was that underdevelopment would
persist. As Wallerstein (1979, p. 20) explained, strong “state machineries in
core areas has as its direct counterpart the decline of the statemachineries in
peripheral areas.” Indeed, since potentially taxable surpluses shifted to ad-
vanced nations through exploitative relationships, peripheral states were
consigned to perennially limited public revenues to invest in building up ca-
pable bureaucracies (Kentor 1981).2 To be sure, dependency and world systems theories are not entirely equivalent; most
notably, the former argued that the capitalist world economy had a bimodal core-periphery
structure, while the latter added appreciation for the “semi-periphery” (Karataşlı 2017).
However, in relation to state capacity, both theories reach similar conclusions: weak state
capacity prevails (Wallerstein 1979).
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pacity as an essential component for peripheral states to improve their po-
sition among peripheral countries; that is, to achieve so-called dependent
development (Evans 1979). Rather than a paragon of Weberianness (as de-
fined above), the dependent-development state is primarily the instrument
of the national-industrialist capitalist class allied with international capital
(Evans 1979). By implication, such states are proficient at advancing the in-
terests of ruling economic and political elites, often in the context of authori-
tarianism. Yet, they lack the bureaucratic apparatus necessary to effectively
deliver public goods. For example, over the 1960s and 1970s, the captured
bureaucracy of Kenya under President Jomo Kenyatta delivered concentrated
benefits to political and economic elites of the president’s own ethnic group
(the Kikuyu) but failed to implement policies that would improve the long-
run developmental trajectory of the country or the well-being of nonaligned
ethnic groups (Leys 1975; Stubbs 2015).
While initial studies on trade exports and investments in raw material
production or agriculture focused on relationships of colonial dominance,
scholars soon emphasized new forms of dependency consolidated in the
postwar period. They argued that foreign aid constituted an extension of
the relationship of dependency that served to preserve or widen economic
disparities between core and peripheral nations (Dos Santos 1970; Hayter
1971; see also Moyo 2009). In this context, donor states provide aid to in-
crease the likelihood that governments of the peripherywill tolerate the con-
tinuation of outflows of private profits and interest on past debts (Hayter
1971). Such aid may support governments by providing a short-term solu-
tion to economic difficulties, but in the long term it perpetuates dependence
on continued foreign aid flows (Hayter 1971). A separate strand of literature
also highlighted how aid may undermine state capacity: countries with
greater foreign aid revenue are less reliant on tax revenues drawn from cit-
izens and thus face less domestic pressure to maintain popular legitimacy
through investment in effective public institutions (Bräutigam and Knack
2004; Moss, Pettersson, and Van de Walle 2006).
More recent perspectives document how international financial institutions
(IFIs)—the IMF, theWorld Bank, and regional development banks—deepen
core-periphery dependency relations (Bradshaw and Huang 1991; Shandra
et al. 2004; Harper and Snowden 2017). These studies posit that IFIs inhibit
economic development by siphoning surplus from developing countries in the
form of debt and interest payments on loans. Further, the practice of condi-
tionality gives creditors—the high-income countries controlling IFI opera-
tions—unparalleled leverage to alter the political economies of borrowing
countries in the interests of the West (Stone 2002; Babb 2009). Most conspic-
uously,Western business and financial interests have benefited from securing
contracts and expanding their access to developing countries implementing1228
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Hollowing Out State Capacitystructural adjustment programs (Wedel 1998; Gould 2003; Sassen 2014). This
evidence is in line with the expectations of world systems theory: the condi-
tionalities of the IMF and development banks entrench developing countries
within the periphery of the global economic architecture. However, scholars
have yet to macrocomparatively examine the specific impact of international
organizations—like the IMF—on state capacity, even though qualitative case
studies find evidence of a negative effect (Ban 2016).
In short, according to world systems and dependency theories, weak states
occupy peripheral positions in the world economic order and are kept compli-
ant through their dependence on foreign investment, aid, and loans from IFIs.
In this context, these institutions affirm the power inequities inherent in glob-
alization (Halliday and Carruthers 2009). The empirical challenge, then, is to
identify how world system pressures affect state capacity in the developing
world, and—to this end—we focus on the case of the activities of the IMF,
widely considered “the world’s most powerful agen[t] of economic reform”
(Halliday and Carruthers 2007, p. 1137). In other words, this organization
serves as a “strategic research site” (Merton 1987), offering an analytical lens
for empirical scrutiny into the organizational apparatus of the world system
and its impact on state capacity.IMF CONDITIONALITY AND BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY
To what extent and how does IMF conditionality affect bureaucratic qual-
ity, a key element of state capacity? The substantive content of conditional-
ity reflects the belief in neoclassical economics—an intellectual tradition
firmly located in core capitalist nations (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb
2002)—that states should perform aminimal role in the economy (Callaghy
1989, p. 116). According to this line of thinking, government interventions
in the economy, especially through industrial policy, crowd out the private
sector and spur rent seeking and inefficient allocation of resources (e.g.,
Krueger 1974). Having embraced such ideas during training at prestigious
economics departments (like the University of Chicago) and emboldened by
the rise to power of free-market ideologues (like Ronald Reagan and Mar-
garet Thatcher), IMF staff put antistate economic theories into policy prac-
tice from the 1980s onward (Babb 2009; Nelson 2014; Kentikelenis and
Seabrooke 2017). Structural adjustment programs rolling out “Washington
consensus” policies of privatization, liberalization, and deregulation be-
came ubiquitous across the developing world (Williamson 1990; Summers
and Pritchett 1993; Babb 2009). As world systems perspectives would predict,
lending programs under IMF auspices generally failed to promote economic
growth (Dreher 2006), and their socioeconomic consequences were deleterious
(Babb 2005; Sassen 2014; Kentikelenis 2017, 2018; Stubbs and Kentikelenis
2017; Daoud and Reinsberg 2018; Reinsberg et al. 2019).1229
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AllExamining the causes of poor performance, political economists have noted
the paradox that structural adjustment programs assume states’ capability to
implement complex economic and administrative policies and simultaneously
stipulate reforms that hollow out the state, most notably by defunding or re-
structuring the bureaucracy (Callaghy 1989; Haggard and Kaufman 1989;
Biersteker 1990; Haggard andKaufman 1992, p. 25;Waterbury 1992). Even-
tually, this reality caught upwith IMF staff,who—from the 1990s—started to
promote the “good governance” agenda, itself a set of Western norms about
how states should be organized (Kiely 1998). These efforts centered on reduc-
ing corruption by limiting the scope of bureaucratic authorizations, introduc-
ing tax reforms, increasing fiscal transparency, and removing price subsidies
on government services (Mitra et al. 2016). Critics of this approach have long
noted that, while many elements of this policy agenda are desirable, they are
neither necessary nor sufficient criteria for spurring development (Kiely 1998).
The tailoring, sequencing, and pacing of reforms is of utmost importance but
rarely given appropriate treatment in blanket one-size-fits-all good gover-
nance prescriptions (Grindle 2004). Indeed, countries that have managed to
escape underdevelopment built up bureaucratic capacities despite not meet-
ing most tenets of this policy agenda (Wade 1990).
We build on—but also depart from—world systems accounts of the role of
powerful international organizations. After all, these organizations are devel-
oped to solve global coordination problems, and membership carries some
privileges and opportunities for countries that join (Barnett and Finnemore
2004). For example, a key mandate of the IMF is to help countries achieve
balance-of-payments stability, a factor contributing to economic development
and not ipso facto dependency inducing.What matters is how this mandate is
put to practice. Our starting premise is that not all IMF programs are alike
and that we need to consider the content of specific conditions. Following pre-
vious studies and the IMF’s own classificatory schema, we distinguish be-
tween “structural conditions” and “stabilization conditions” (e.g., Vreeland
2007; Dreher 2009; Woo 2013). This distinction is useful because it allows
us to untangle the bureaucratic quality effect of quantitative reductions in
state activity in the economy from the effect of qualitative changes in theways
that states govern societies.Structural Conditions and Bureaucratic Quality
Since the mid-1980s, the IMF advocated structural conditions to tackle the
purported root causes of economic weakness (Nowzad 1981; Khan and
Knight 1983; Polak 1991). Structural conditions have attracted criticism be-
cause they impinge on the sovereignty of borrowers, while at the same time
failing to demonstrate effectiveness in resolving economic crises (Easterly
2005). We add to this criticism that structural conditions undermine bu-1230
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Hollowing Out State Capacityreaucratic quality through their impact on the behavior of state bureaucrats
and private businesses.
Structural conditions lower the ability of the state to attract or retain qual-
ified personnel. These conditions cut deeply into public sector entitlements,
including working conditions, social security, average pay, and additional
benefits. For example, Armenia’s 1995 IMF program required the govern-
ment to “finalize a plan to . . . eliminat[e] or merge ministries” (IMF 1995,
p. 16). In 1996, Georgia was asked to “reduce the number of ministries and
committees” (IMF 1996, p. 25). The IMF also pushed for wage cuts and greater
wage dispersion. For example, in Bulgaria, the government was required to
“submit . . . amendments to the Labor Code with provisions making hiring,
firing, and working hours more flexible” (IMF 2000, p. 68). In addition, struc-
tural conditions ask countries to cede ownership of state-owned enterprises
to private actors. The IMF argues that these measures are necessary to im-
prove the business climate, foster job creation, and support growth over the
medium term (IMF 2014), identifying the public sector as the major cause of
fiscal deficits and sluggish performance (Waterbury 1992, p. 183). But these
measures carry important downsides for the bureaucracy, as job insecurity
and reduced pay may result in resignations, early retirements, or reduced will-
ingness to deliver public services impartially.
From the perspective of business actors, structural conditions seek to re-
move privileges (i.e., rent extraction) in selected sectors of the economy. For
example, in its program with Bulgaria, the IMFmandated issuance of a de-
cree that eliminated tariff quotas and exemptions. The same agreement
mandated lower import tariffs for a range of goods and a reduction in the
dispersion of tariff rates. Other conditions seek to eliminate state subsidies,
price guarantees, and regulatory protections. From the perspective of the IMF,
the rationale for these measures “stems from the purposes of the IMF and the
importance of open trade regimes for sustainable growth, durable macro-
economic stabilization, and balance of payments viability” (IMF 2001b). How-
ever, threatened by the removal of protection, businesses will increase their
efforts to lobby state bureaucrats to prevent the envisaged policy changes
(Haggard and Kaufman 1989, p. 223). As a consequence of structural condi-
tions, business actors may thus paralyze the state administration with requests
to protect their privilege.Stabilization Conditions and Bureaucratic Quality
The IMFconsiders economic crises to primarily be the result of excessive de-
mand; consequently, its policy conditions seek to reduce aggregate demand
(Polak 1991). For this purpose, the IMF mandates stabilization conditions
on macroeconomic variables such as external debt, the fiscal balance, and
inflation rates. Stabilization conditions specify broad targets on these mac-1231
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tion in the short term.
To be sure, adjustment toward stringent stabilization targets can worsen
economic crises (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Dreher 2006; Dreher and
Walter 2010) and impose high social costs (Babb 2005; Kentikelenis 2017;
Stubbs et al. 2017; Stubbs and Kentikelenis 2018). However, with respect
to bureaucratic quality, stabilization conditions are neutral. This is because
these conditions do not necessarily change theways inwhich the state carries
out its functions (Tanzi 1998). For example, almost all IMF programs re-
quire ceilings on government debt (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016),
as excessively high debt-to-GDP ratios increase borrowing costs and the
likelihood of economic shocks. But there are several ways in which govern-
ments can limit their indebtedness: they may renegotiate the terms of existing
debt contracts to ease debt service, reduce government subsidies, and boost tax
collection; they may also take measures to promote economic growth, which
reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio.
In short, stabilization conditions do not oblige governments to enact specific
reforms but leave themwith some discretion in how to achieve economic pol-
icy objectives. Governments will use this discretion to protect the state-society
relationships that are vital to policy implementation. More specifically, gov-
ernments will avoid alienating business interests and imposing burdens on
the public sector unless explicitly forced to do so by respective structural con-
ditions, as these interest groups are well-organized lobbies whose cooperation
is required for policy implementation (Haggard and Kaufman 1992, p. 25;
Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012). Thus, unlike structural conditions, sta-
bilization conditions allow governments to circumvent difficult reforms that
drain their implementing capacity. By leaving unaffected the ways in which
states govern their relationships with important societal actors, stabilization
conditions do not have the same negative impact on bureaucratic quality as
structural conditions do.DATA AND METHODS
Our initial data set comprises 141 developing countries observed from 1985
to 2014.3We collapse all information into three-year periods.4 Atmost 11 pe-
riods are available per country. Arranging the data in three-year periods has
two advantages. First, our substantive interest is in how IMF programs af-
fect state capacity over the medium term. State capacity is an inherentlyWe exclude high-income countries because they already have high bureaucratic quality
the period under study and almost no IMF programs, which would unduly raise the
trength of our results.
Our results are robust to averaging over two-year periods.3
in
s
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Hollowing Out State Capacityslow-moving variable, so a focus on medium-term effects is justified be-
cause building capable states is almost impossible in the short run. Second,
short-term measurement of state capacity is plagued with subjectivity bias,
which implies that measures may react to events unrelated to what they are
supposed to measure (Stubbs, King, and Stuckler 2014). Averaging obser-
vations over several years filters out noise due to perception bias; it also en-
hances the statistical properties of variables with discrete measurement lev-
els (Dreher and Siemers 2009).Research Design
Dependent Variables
State capacity is operationalized as BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY, measured us-
ing the corresponding perception-based indicator from the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). It scores high in “countries where the bureau-
cracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in
policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries,
the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure
and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training” (PRS
Group 2015).5 The ICRG indicator on bureaucratic quality is widely used in
the literature on state capacity (e.g., Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001;
Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Broich et al. 2015). To ease interpretation, we re-
scale the variable to range from 0 to 100.
To check the validity of our outcome measure, we correlated the ICRG in-
dicator with two widely used alternative cross-sectional measures of bureau-
cratic quality (see the online appendix). First, the ICRG measure is highly
correlated with the Weberianness index and specifically its subcomponents
on merit-based recruitment, competitive salaries, and bureaucratic quality
(Evans and Rauch 1999). Second, the ICRG measure is strongly correlated
with professionalism and impartiality of public administration, as measured
by the Quality of Government Institute (Dahlström et al. 2015). Furthermore,
following the methods proposed by Kurtz and Schrank (2007), we conduct
auxiliary regressions to verify that the ICRG measure is not biased by per-
ceived changes in bureaucratic quality, proxied by contemporaneous eco-
nomic growth (see the online appendix). Using these empirical tests, we ar-
gue that the ICRG indicator closely captures the notion of bureaucratic
quality.
In addition to using the ICRG measure, we examine an experience-based
measure of bureaucratic quality that does not suffer from potential perception5 The codebook does not provide information as to how bureaucratic quality is being as-
sessed but notes that assessments aremade on the basis of subjective analysis of the avail-
able information.
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Allbias: the percentage of firms experiencing acts of bribery by public officials,
available from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Sur-
vey (BEEPS; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
World Bank 2016). While freedom from corruption is not tantamount to bu-
reaucratic quality, a public administration that is relatively free of corruption
is likely to be more capable than one that is mired by corruption (Rothstein
and Teorell 2012). Indeed, empirical studies often rely on corruption as a
proxy for administrative quality (Adserà, Boix, and Payne 2003; Bäck and
Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010). We thus consider the BEEPS
measure to be an appropriate alternative to the ICRG measure.Independent Variables
As discussed earlier, our expectation is that not all parts of an IMF program
affect bureaucratic quality. Different program elements—such as loan re-
sources, loan conditions, and technical advice—may have different effects.
Allowing for such effect heterogeneity, we employ several measures.
In regressions that seek to establish the total effect of IMFprograms,we use
a binary variable indicating the presence of an IMF PROGRAM in the relevant
period. This variable captures the overall effect of IMF involvement (e.g.,
Vreeland 2003; Atoyan and Conway 2006; Nooruddin and Simmons 2006).
We subsequently conduct regressions among observations with IMF pro-
grams that include the number of STRUCTURALCONDITIONS and STABILIZATION
CONDITIONS in these programs.6
For robustness tests, we use additional indicators, such as the total number
of conditions (Dreher andVaubel 2004; Copelovitch 2010). Referred to as ALL
CONDITIONS in regression outputs, the total number of conditions captures the
overall depth of conditionality. In addition, we test separately for the impact
of conditions on the PUBLIC SECTOR, PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTER-
PRISES, and PRICE DEREGULATION.
We only count binding conditions in each category, which include so-
called prior actions and performance criteria (Dreher 2009; Copelovitch
2010;Woo 2013; Stubbs et al. 2017). This choice is appropriate because bind-
ing conditions directly determine scheduled disbursements of loans: failure to
implement them can lead to program suspensions. In contrast, nonbinding
conditions serve as markers for broader progress assessment, and nonim-
plementation does not automatically suspend loan payments (IMF 2001a).It is useful to include both conditions in one regression to untangle the effects of both
pes of conditionality. Woo (2013) includes only the number of structural conditions
long with a program dummy, which is problematic because the estimate on structural
onditions may also pick up some effects of stabilization conditions to the degree that6
ty
a
c
both types of conditions are correlated.
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Hollowing Out State CapacityIMF variables are drawn from a newly constructed database on IMF condi-
tionality from 1985 to 2014 (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). All above variables are
lagged by one period to allow for some delay in the realization of effects.Control Variables
We rely on a set of control variables drawn from the literature on state capac-
ity. Most studies focus on the macrohistorical determinants of state capacity,
which include legal origin, geography, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization
(e.g., Alonso and Garcimartín 2013; Savoia and Sen 2015). Our inclusion of
countryfixed effects obviates the need to control for these time-invariantmea-
sures; subsequently, we thus focus on time-varying correlates of bureaucratic
quality (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and
Lapuente 2010). Bureaucratic quality is driven by a range of socioeconomic
factors.First,we include the natural log ofGDPPERCAPITA, given thatwealth-
ier states are better able to sustain capable bureaucracies (e.g., Bäck and
Hadenius 2008).We also include the level of democracymeasured by the POL-
ITY IV INDEX (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2015). Citizens in democracies hold
government more accountable and are able to express demands for public
goods, which should increase incentives to invest into a capable bureaucracy
(Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010; Fortin-Rittberger
2014). Empirical studies also show a positive effect of democracy on gover-
nance quality, measured by the control of corruption (Montinola and Jack-
man 2002), bureaucratic quality (Bäck and Hadenius 2008), and various in-
dexes of governance (Adserà et al. 2003; Charron and Lapuente 2010). In
addition,wemeasure the incidence ofCIVILWAR (Gleditsch et al. 2002), which
negatively affects the extractive capacity of the state and thereby reduces its
capacity (Centeno 2002; Besley and Persson 2008) and is in contrast to exter-
nalwar that offers incentives to invest in state capacity (Tilly 1990; Besley and
Persson 2008; Lektzian and Prins 2008). The above control variables are used
in most studies on state capacity, and therefore we consider them a minimal
set.
In robustness checks, we expand the set of control variables to include
variables on integration into the world economy and access to nontax re-
sources. In particular, TRADE OPENNESS may indicate the entrenchment of
exploitative trade relationships with core nations that diminish resources
in peripheral nations to build state capacity (Kentor 1981); alternatively,
it may increase pressures for redistribution and hence the need for a more
sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus (Bäck andHadenius 2008).We trans-
form this variable using the natural logarithm to normalize its distribution.
Economists have also noted the potential benefits of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) for state institutions (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles 2003; Alfaro,1235
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AllKalemli-Özcan, and Sayek 2009), whereas dependency theorists view it as
an additional transfer in surplus to the core (Baran 1957; Frank 1967); we
therefore include the natural log of FDI INFLOWS as a percentage of GDP.
Aid dependence—measured by OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)
per capita—could both enhance and diminish bureaucratic quality. While
it provides resources that can be used to build administrative capacity (Jones
and Tarp 2016), it also represents nontax revenue and hence might reduce
accountability (Moss et al. 2006; Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol
2008). Finally, we include the natural log of OIL PRODUCTION per capita as
another important source of nontax revenue (Humphreys 2005; Thies 2010;
Ross 2013).7 The online appendix presents descriptive statistics (table B1) and
detailed variable definitions (table B2).
In addition to these variables, we always include a lagged dependent var-
iable, country fixed effects, and period fixed effects. Inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable reflects the fact that bureaucratic quality moves rather
slowly, while also addressing concerns about serial correlation (Keele and
Kelly 2005). Country fixed effects absorb all unobserved time-invariant het-
erogeneity, and period fixed effects capture period-specific factors that affect
all countries equally with respect to bureaucratic quality. Finally, we also
checked for potential nonstationarity in the dependent variable (table B7)
using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, which rejects the null hypothesis
that panels contain a unit root (P < :001).Methods
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate the total effect of IMF
programs on bureaucratic quality by comparing the evolution of bureau-
cratic quality for countries that underwent IMF programs and those that
did not. Second, for all countries under IMF programs, we compare coun-
tries with specific conditions to those without, thus estimating the effect of
conditionality (among panel observations with IMF programs).8 This ap-
proach enables us to isolate the kinds of conditions with the strongest im-
pact on bureaucratic quality.
This approach involves two challenges. The first one is the well-known
sample selection bias, which arises because borrowing countries are inherently
different from nonborrowing countries, and these differences may be sys-
tematically related to bureaucratic quality. The conventional approach toUnless otherwise stated, control variables are drawn from the Quality of Government
nstitute database (Teorell et al. 2016).
We conduct the instrumental variables analysis using multiequationmaximum-likelihood7
I
8estimation with correlated errors, available through Stata module cmp (Roodman 2011).
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Hollowing Out State Capacityaddress nonrandom selection is aHeckmanmodel (see the online appendix).
The main idea is to explicitly model the selection into IMF programs and
then use the so-called inverse Mills ratio as an additional predictor in the
bureaucratic quality equation. We employ a standard set of variables from
previous literature to explain selection of countries into IMF programs. To
enhance the reliability of the estimation, at least one of those variables should
serve as an “exclusion restriction”—a variable that explains program partic-
ipation but does not affect bureaucratic quality except through its impact on
program participation. Following previous literature, we argue that the align-
ment of voting patterns between the borrowing country and the Group of
Seven countries in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) fulfills
this criterion because political allies of big powers receive favorable treat-
ment in the IFIs (Thacker 1999; Barro and Lee 2005; Dreher, Sturm, and
Vreeland 2009). At the same time, the voting behavior of IMF borrowers
is plausibly unrelated to bureaucratic quality.We therefore include the var-
iable UNGAVOTE ALIGNMENT (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2015). In ad-
dition, we include the number of COUNTRIES UNDER PROGRAMS, since pro-
gram participation is affected by the extent to which the IMF has resources
available; this in turn depends on the current number of program countries
(Vreeland 2003, p. 88). Moreover, past involvement of a country in an IMF
program reliably predicts current participation (Easterly 2005). We thus in-
clude PAST PROGRAM, a dummy variable indicating whether a country had a
program before. These three variables—along with regional effects and time
period dummies—explain a significant proportion of IMF programs and
therefore constitute our baseline variables in the selection equation. In an ex-
tended specification presented in the online appendix, we addmacroeconomic
fundamentals, including foreign reserves, debt service, current account bal-
ance, as well as political factors, notably the incidence of national elections.
In preview of our findings, we find that different specifications for the selection
model do not affect our main results.
An additional challenge—not relevant for previous research that only used
program dummies to identify the effect of IMF programs—is potential en-
dogeneity of conditions. For example, countries may be more likely to obtain
certain types of policy conditions from the IMF precisely because their bu-
reaucratic quality is weak to begin with. In this case, our estimates would re-
flect this selection process rather than the genuine impact of conditions on
our outcome of interest. To address this challenge, we use an instrument for
IMF conditionality. In our case, a valid instrument is a variable that predicts
the number of conditions (relevance criterion) but affects bureaucratic qual-
ity only through its impact on conditionality (exclusion criterion). Instruments
are hard to find, but we are able to draw on an instrumentation strategy that
has been popularized mainly in aid effectiveness research (e.g., Bun andHar-
rison 2014; Nunn and Qian 2014; Lang 2016). For each type of condition, we1237
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Allconstruct a compound instrument based on the interaction of the within-
country average of these conditions and the period-specific budget constraint
of the IMF as measured by the number of COUNTRIES UNDER PROGRAMS. This
instrument is relevant because if the IMF needs to assist more countries, its
budget constraint becomes binding, and it will require more conditions to safe-
guard repayment (Vreeland 2003; Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Lang 2016). The
instrument is valid, too, because even if there were endogeneity between the
time-variant budget constraint and bureaucratic quality, the exclusion restric-
tion would only be violated if the unobserved variables driving this relation
were correlated with the country-specific average of conditionality (see, e.g.,
Bun and Harrison 2014; Lang 2016; Stubbs et al. 2018). In all regressions
that involve conditionality, we control for the nonselection hazard, in order
to remove potential bias due to an unrepresentative sample.9RESULTS
Total Effect of IMF Programs
We utilize multivariate analysis using data aggregated into three-year peri-
ods. Table 1 reveals no significant relationship between IMF programs and
bureaucratic quality. This finding holds for alternative sets of control vari-
ables.Model 1 includes no control variables except for the lagged dependent
variable (called X0) in the outcome equation andminimal controls in the se-
lection equation (Z1). Model 2 adds the most commonly used control vari-
ables to the outcome stage—income per capita, democracy, civil war, and
economic growth (X1). Model 3 includes additional variables related to de-
mographics, economic integration, and resource endowments (X2). The last
two models extend the set of variables in the selection equation to include
macroeconomic variables from the World Development Indicators (World
Bank 2015)—currency reserves, debt service, and external balance—and in-
dicators for national elections from the Database of Political Institutions
(Beck et al. 2001) to capture political motivations for requesting IMF sup-
port (Z2). Inclusion of these variables reduces the number of observations;
therefore, a trade-off exists between model fit versus model parsimony
and estimation efficiency.
In general, we find that coefficient estimates of control variables in the out-
come equation depend on the specification of the selection equation. Model 5
yields results consistent with theoretical expectations; for example, factors re-
lating positively to bureaucratic quality include income per capita and FDI
inflows, while civil war is negatively related.9 We are concerned that data are not missing at random, which could bias our results. As
we show in the online appendix, this concern is unwarranted: missingness in the depen-
dent variable is unrelated to IMF program status and a host of other control variables.
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Hollowing Out State CapacityThe Effects of IMF Conditionality
Following our theoretical discussion, we explore whether structural condi-
tions are harmful for bureaucratic quality. By conditioning on observations
with IMFprograms, we essentially compare a program country under a spe-
cific conditionality profile to the same country under a different conditional-
ity profile. Inclusion of an inverse Mills ratio addresses potential selection
bias from only considering countries under IMF programs.
Table 2 presents regression results of bureaucratic quality on two key
types of IMF conditions. Consistent with theoretical expectations, we find
that structural conditions reduce bureaucratic quality; stabilization condi-TABLE 1
Total Effect of IMF Programs on Bureaucratic Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IMF program . . . . . . . . . . 1.41 .45 2.06 22.67 21.79
(1.59) (1.62) (1.75) (2.05) (2.12)
Lagged bureaucratic
quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76*** .76*** .76*** .75*** .76***
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Log(GDP per capita) . . . . 4.97*** 4.61** 3.38 4.53*
(1.76) (2.02) (2.14) (2.59)
Polity IV index . . . . . . . . . .04 2.07 .05 2.01
(.10) (.11) (.12) (.13)
Civil war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.43 21.91 26.65*** 24.91**
(1.83) (1.91) (2.01) (2.08)
GDP growth . . . . . . . . . . . .10 .09 .15 .11
(.07) (.10) (.11) (.14)
Log(dependency ratio) . . . 1.99 2.15
(4.66) (8.20)
Log(trade openness) . . . . . 3.04** 2.80
(1.51) (2.00)
Log(FDI inflows) . . . . . . . .76 1.62**
(.61) (.71)
Log(ODA per capita) . . . . .30 2.21
(.49) (.53)
Log(oil per capita). . . . . . . 21.14 21.30
(.76) (.82)
Outcome equation
controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . X0 X1 X2 X1 X2
Selection equation
controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . Z1 Z1 Z1 Z2 Z2
Observations . . . . . . . . . . . 718 633 595 467 449
v2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,630.41 5,333.58 5,083.51 3,866.86 3,789.56This content do
All use subject to University of wnloaded fr
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p://www.journNOTE.—Sample includes all observations arranged in three-year periods. The dependent
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* P < .10.
** P < .05.
*** P < .01.1239
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Alltions do not have a significant impact. Note that these estimates can be in-
terpreted causally as a result of instrumentation. Using model 5 to interpret
effect magnitudes, we find that one structural condition reduces bureaucratic
quality by, on average, 1.24 points on a 0–100 scale (P < :05), all else equal.
For an increase by 1 standard deviation (SD 5 3:27), bureaucratic quality
reduces by 4.04 points (one-fifth of its standard deviation). Given our dy-
namic model specification, a 1 standard deviation increase in the number
of structural conditions thus exerts a cumulative impact of 18.4 points (almost
1 standard deviation of bureaucratic quality).10 Hence, the near-universal
adoption of structural adjustment measures in the 1990s has substantive
long-lasting effects.
The above results are credible for at least two reasons. First, our models
include numerous control variables, which represent a more stringent test
for our variables of interest. In particular, two-way fixed effects and a
lagged dependent variable absorb a lot of variation. It is therefore not sur-
prising that none of the control variables reach statistical significance. Sec-
ond, our diagnostic statistics for the compound instruments are strong. The
Kleibergen-PaapF-statistics are far above the conventional threshold of 10—
a critical value below which the potential bias from weak instruments be-
comes too large to compensate for the original bias from not using any instru-
ments at all (Staiger andStock 1997). TheF-statistics in our regressions imply
that the bias from weak instruments is less than 5% of the endogeneity bias
(Stock and Yogo 2005).Further Analyses
We conduct additional analysis to ensure that our key findings are not driven
by alternative explanations. In particular, we verify that structural condi-
tions, rather than a more general burden of adjustment arising from a high
number of program conditions, are responsible for the decline in bureaucratic
quality. To discard this alternative interpretation, we examine the impact of
ALL CONDITIONS on bureaucratic quality, again using compound instru-
mentation to mitigate potential endogeneity. As shown in table 3, the num-
ber of conditions alone does not undermine bureaucratic quality.While the
point estimate indeed is negative (mirroring the negative total effect of
IMF programs earlier), it is not significant. It also is harder to find a strong
instrument for the total number of conditions, most likely because there is
less variation in the number of conditions than in the specific content of
conditions.10 This is computed as follows: bS=ð1 2 aÞ, where a is the coefficient on the lagged depen-
dent variable, and ßS is the coefficient on structural conditions.
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Hollowing Out State CapacityIn addition, our theory sheds some light on potential mechanisms through
which conditionality affects bureaucratic quality, notably policy conditions
on public sector employment, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and
deregulation of prices. As discussed previously, public sector reforms man-
dated by the IMF may have detrimental effects on the ability of states to re-
tain qualified personnel. As shown in table 3, we find significantly negative
effects in three models (notably, the ones with the more credible set of control
variables but with fewer observations included). Effect magnitudes are
strong, given that each public sector condition is associated with a decline
in bureaucratic quality by 4.49 points on average.
Conditions on the privatization of state-owned enterprises are thought to
reduce bureaucratic quality by lowering the permissible range of instru-
ments through which state administrations can influence market exchange.
By removing states as stakeholders of businesses, privatization leads to a
reduction in the flow of information between state bureaucrats and business
representatives. Table 3 corroborates our expectations of a significantly neg-
ative effect of privatization conditions on bureaucratic quality. Regardless
of model specification, coefficient estimates are substantively large and sta-
tistically significant (P < :05); each privatization condition is associated with
a decline in bureaucratic quality by up to 8.64 points.
Conditions on deregulating prices can reduce bureaucratic quality by re-
moving the specific instruments necessary to devise smart industrial policies.
Table 3 indeed shows a deleterious effect of price deregulation conditions on
bureaucratic quality in four models. Substantively, each such condition re-
duces bureaucratic quality by up to 2.68 index points (P < :05). Diagnostic
statistics do not suggest weak-instrument bias.
The above results reveal the specific types of structural conditions that
adversely affect bureaucratic quality, as echoed by previous qualitative re-
search. For example, structural conditions have compromised the ability of
some African states to adequately respond to the Ebola outbreak. While re-
forms to the remuneration of public health workers mandated by IMF con-
ditions led to the emigration of qualified personnel, the decentralization of
health care systems made it more difficult for state authorities to mobilize a
coordinated response to the outbreak (Kentikelenis et al. 2015).
A remaining concern is the possibility that findings are driven merely by
changes in perceptions about bureaucratic quality. Therefore, we verify
that our argument holds using the BEEPS measure of the percentage of
firms experiencing acts of bribery by public officials. In order to include
country fixed effects, we discard all countries with less than two survey
waves, which leaves us with 125 observations from 43 countries overall.
As before, we first scrutinize the total impact of IMF programs before con-
sidering the two types of IMF conditions. Table 4 shows the results. Col-
umn 1 tests for the overall impact of IMF programs using country-level1241
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Allcontrols. When a country undergoes a program, its reported incidence of
corruption increases by roughly 18%. Column 2 suggests that structural
conditions further increase corruption: each additional structural condition
increases the percentage of firms experiencing acts of bribery by 2.7%
(P < :05). The effect of stabilization conditions remains insignificant. In
the subsequentmodels, we add control variables available from the BEEPS
survey related to firm characteristics. This improves model fit but turns the
effect of IMF programs and the inverse Mills ratio insignificant. The nega-
tive effect of structural conditions becomes even stronger (P < :05), while
stabilization conditions tend to mitigate corruption in this model (P < :10).
Overall, the replicability of our results using an experience-based measure
of bureaucratic quality increases our confidence in the main results.TABLE 3
Further Regressions on IMF Conditionality and Bureaucratic Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All conditions . . . . . . . 2.39 2.50 2.65 2.71 2.96
(.43) (.54) (.64) (.65) (.76)
Public sector
conditions . . . . . . . . 22.45* 21.77 21.98 23.83* 24.49**
(1.47) (1.47) (1.62) (2.07) (2.15)
Privatization
conditions . . . . . . . . 28.18** 27.52** 28.21** 27.82** 28.64**
(3.58) (3.48) (3.87) (3.77) (4.00)
Price deregulation
conditions . . . . . . . . 22.55** 22.42** 22.58** 22.30 22.68**
(1.05) (1.06) (1.01) (1.46) (1.35)
Outcome equation
controls . . . . . . . . . . X0 X1 X2 X1 X2
Selection equation
controls . . . . . . . . . . Z1 Z1 Z1 Z2 Z2
Observations . . . . . . . . 421 388 377 298 289
Log likelihood . . . . . . . 23,725.12 23,312.63 23,208.46 23,001.81 22,904.99
F-statistic . . . . . . . . . . 7.70 4.63 3.99 4.63 3.991244
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three-year periods. The dependent variable is BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY (0–100). The respective
number of conditions is instrumented using the interaction between the country-specific mean
of these conditions and the number of countries under IMF programs in a period. All control
variables are included but suppressed for reasons of limited space. F-statistic shown is for “all
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Hollowing Out State CapacityRobustness Tests
The online appendix includes the results of all estimating equations as well
as further robustness tests.With respect to selection into IMF programs, we
find that past programs, low reserves in months of imports, current account
deficits, and executive elections are robust predictors of current programs.
Coefficients on UNGA voting patterns are not always statistically signifi-
cant but have the expected sign. With respect to the determinants of struc-
tural conditions, we find that low per capita income, absence of civil war,
low growth, and small inflows of FDI are significant determinants.
We also used an alternative definition of our conditionality variables that
deducts the number of conditions for which countries obtained a waiver
during the course of the adjustment program (table B3). In exceptional cir-
cumstances, but also as a result of intervention of big powers on behalf of
their geopolitical allies, the executive board can waive certain conditions
in order to help countries pass the staff review on their loan program (Babb
and Carruthers 2008, p. 20). Taking waivers into account does not substan-TABLE 4
Incidence of Corruption and IMF Conditionality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IMF program . . . . . . . . . . 17.95* 18.40** 7.82 8.17
(9.51) (8.90) (9.26) (7.82)
Structural conditions . . . . 2.70** 3.97**
(1.28) (1.77)
Stabilization conditions . . . 2.79 2.90*
(.59) (.50)
Inverse Mills ratio. . . . . . . 210.22** 210.70** 25.44 25.34
(4.65) (4.18) (4.22) (3.32)
Fixed effects . . . . . . . . . . . Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country controls . . . . . . . . Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls . . . . . . . . . . No No Yes Yes
Within R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 .65 .22 .62
Observations . . . . . . . . . . . 125 125 123 123
F-statistic (joint) . . . . . . . . . . . 54.13 . . . 50.79This content downl
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compound instrument approach, we use internal instruments as a second-best alternative. In
this approach, we predict the (lagged) number of conditions by their second lag, standard con-
trols, and time dummies. The exclusion restriction requires that there is no independent impact
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Alltively alter the results. Coefficient estimates on structural conditions remain
negatively significant in most models, while stabilization conditions remain
insignificant. Applying the waiver correction to issue area conditions, we
find that labor conditions remain statistically significant in only twomodels,
privatization conditions remain negatively significant throughout all spec-
ifications, and the four estimates on price deregulation previously found to
be significant also remain significant. Effect magnitudes are comparable, and
instrument diagnostics are strong.
Finally, we show that our results do not hinge on the assumption that
countries have high levels of bureaucratic quality to begin with. To be sure,
state-society arrangements—such as embedded autonomy—require a pro-
fessionalized bureaucracy (Haggard and Kaufmann 1992, p. 20); hence,
structural conditions will have the most detrimental impact where they un-
dermine intact state-society arrangements (while having less impact where
such arrangements do not exist in the first place). However, even weak
states have some pockets of bureaucratic quality (McDonnell 2017, p. 483);
therefore, bureaucratic quality can decline as a result of conditionality, even
in low-capacity states. We conduct a series of regressions excluding the (pur-
portedly) least capable states; our argument would be supported if our ef-
fects remained similar, while it would be refuted if effects were to subside
without these weak states. We use three different indicators of weak capac-
ity: fragile states (World Bank 2016), low-income countries (gross national
income per capita belowUS$1,025), and countries in the lowest decile of ini-
tial bureaucratic quality. Our main results are unaffected by these sample
restrictions.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article examined the impact of structural adjustment programs on the
bureaucratic quality of developing countries. These programs coerce govern-
ments of nations in the global periphery to adopt policy reforms that—explic-
itly or implicitly—favor the interests of core capitalist nations and are thus
ideal sites to study world system pressures. We used a data set of up to 141
developing countries observed over three-year periods from 1985 to 2014
and deployed an appropriate econometric toolkit to find that structural con-
ditions lead to lower bureaucratic quality. Further probing into the policy is-
sues targeted by conditionality, we find that conditions on state-owned enter-
prise privatization, price deregulation, and—to a lesser extent—public sector
employment flexibility have a significantly negative effect on bureaucratic
quality. Our argument is further bolstered by converging results on two sep-
arate indicators of bureaucratic quality—a perception-based measure from
ICRG and an experience-based measure from firm surveys.1246
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Hollowing Out State CapacityBefore discussing broader implications of our findings, we note two lim-
itations. First, our results are based primarily on a subjective measure of
state capacity. To be sure, subjective measures are widely used in the rele-
vant literature (Adserà et al. 2003; Bräutigam andKnack 2004; Broich et al.
2015). Among these indicators, the ICRG index is still themost widely avail-
able (covering the period from 1984 to 2014), and its values can be com-
pared over time. Another advantage is that they seek to measure capacity
rather than willingness to provide public goods. However, subjective mea-
sures are not uncontroversial, mainly due to perception biases (Kurtz and
Schrank 2007; Stubbs et al. 2014). To mitigate this concern, we averaged
all observations into three-year periods to smooth out unsystematic varia-
tion while also testing the validity of the ICRG measure in auxiliary multi-
variate tests. Furthermore, we replicated our findings using a more objec-
tive measure of bureaucratic quality based on experienced corruption of
firms with government officials, reported to the BEEPS.
A second limitation pertains to the more general problem of identifying
causal relationships. Because of our use of instrumental-variable estima-
tion, the negative effect of structural conditions on bureaucratic quality
has a causal interpretation, while the main competing interpretation—that
countries with weak state capacity receive systematically different condi-
tions—can be ruled out. But definitive answers to complex cause-and-effect
questions are rarely possible to obtain using the nonexperimental research
designs typical of the social sciences and deployed in this study (Morgan and
Winship 2007). Econometric innovations have emerged to ameliorate some
of these concerns, but for every strategy there are untestable assumptions,
such as the perennial problem of instrument excludability, as well as the
possibility—however remote—that factors correlate with each other by hap-
penstance.While we employed themost rigorous econometricmethods avail-
able (repletewith checks for robustness of results), ultimately case studies that
gather both quantitative and qualitative data on mechanisms at the national
level of analysis on why particular countries adopt particular IMF programs
would further strengthen confidence in our findings.
More broadly, our study builds a theoretical and empirical bridge between
world systems theory and Weberian-inspired political sociology. World sys-
tems perspectives give a broad-brush account of the emergence and entrench-
ment ofweak states in developing countries as a direct result of the enrichment
of advanced economies; alternatively, Weberian-inspired political sociology
provides richmacrohistorical narratives rooted primarily in domestic political
processes,which emphasize professional bureaucracies as an essential precon-
dition for the development of a capable state.We showed that the global econ-
omy is structured in a way that undermines state capacity in poor countries
and elucidated a set of causal mechanisms by which this process operates.
By identifying the features of IMF programs that undermine bureaucratic1247
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Allquality, we also demonstrated that state capacity is amenable to direct policy
interventionwithinmuch shorter time frames than sociologists had previously
assumed. Taken together, our study offers a conceptual and methodological
toolkit that enables scholars to intersect domestic and world systems level
analyses, as the practices of international organizations—of which the IMF
is but one important case—entrench global power asymmetries.
Viewed in this light, future research can take on the task of developing
nuanced, mechanism-driven explanations of how the world system operates
under the contemporary political-economic institutional environment. This
can include tracing additional global-national or global-subnational links
that lock in underdevelopment and critically examining success cases of pe-
ripheral countries that have managed to carve out specific paths to develop-
ment (Cardoso 2009). An additional avenue for research is to advance anal-
yses of the structure of contemporary globalization based on class (e.g., Block
1978; Sklair 2001) or epistemic privilege (e.g., Seabrooke and Tsingou 2014;
Ban, Seabrooke, and Freitas 2016; Seabrooke and Henriksen 2017). Interna-
tional organizations, via the establishment of global rules and norms, assert
and reinforce privileges of a transnational capitalist elite, and sociologists
have long held the methodological tools necessary to advance these debates
in a rigorous fashion (e.g., Domhoff 1990; Etzion and Davis 2008; Mizruchi
2016).
Given that social scientists from diverse subdisciplines concur that state
capacity is decisive for development and that bureaucratic quality is an es-
sential component of state capacity, our findings will appear as amajor con-
cern for policy makers. While to date no study examines the disaggregated
impact of IMF conditionality on economic growth, previous work has estab-
lished a significantly negative effect of IMF programs per se (Dreher 2006).
Our article thus provides a plausible microfoundation for this result: IMF
conditionality serves to undermine the state capacity underlying successful
development policies that trigger sustained growth.Moreover, state capacity
seems only to become increasingly important as we witness how so-called
failed states can destabilize their neighbors, or even high-income countries
further afield, via large-scale refugee flows or by fomenting extremism that
threatens global peace. Indeed, failed states havemoved center stage in recent
academic debates (Risse andKrasner 2014),while also conjuring nightmarish
perceptions of unbridled chaos in popular media. As the antithesis of capable
states, they lack the ability to protect their borders and implement policies
that could appease their peoples. Ironically, these are also the very sites that
the IMF and other international organizations will be most intimately in-
volved with in the future, potentially replete with detailed policy prescrip-
tions designed to shape political economies in the image ofWestern countries.
Beyond our concern with state capacity, our study offers important les-
sons for all international organizations to consider. Deploying a conceptual1248
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Hollowing Out State Capacitytoolkit derived from world systems theory and Weberian-inspired political
sociology, we now know which elements of IMF programs are counterpro-
ductive and misguided (i.e., structural conditions seeking to rapidly over-
haul domestic institutional arrangements). The stage is thus set for analo-
gous considerations to be made at other international organizations. That
said, it is also the case that an important role remains for the IMF and other
IFIs in assisting countries to overcome balance-of-payments problems. Ful-
filling this role effectively will require fundamental reforms to these organi-
zations. Thankfully, would-be reformers need not look far for inspiration.
JohnMaynardKeynes’s (1943, esp. pp. 3–18) initial proposals for the IMF ac-
knowledged that deficits in some countries are mirror images of surpluses
in others, and so economic adjustment should not only apply to low-income
debtor countries but also to high-income creditor countries.REFERENCES
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